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EXCESSIVE EXERCISE AS CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN
MOORE v. WILLIS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT- HAS
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT "TOTALLY ISOLATED" ITSELF IN
ITS POSITION?
"Granted, athletes are paid a great deal, but when sports start taking
lives instead of generating grins, society needs to take another look at
what's truly important. "
I. INTRODUCTION
An ongoing debate exists over the problems with our nation's
education and sports programs; however, you "never hear experts
arguing - nor see solid research proving - that schools [and ath-
letic teams] would be much better if only the students were beaten
[and punished] more regularly."2 The use of physical discipline, or
corporal punishment, on children has a long and sordid tradition
in America's homes, schools and athletic programs. 3 The recent
deaths of middle school, high school, college, semi-professional
and professional athletes indicates that the use of excessive exercise
and punishment by school officials and coaches can kill.4
1. Edmond Ball, Hot and Bothered: "Are Today's Athletes Pushing Themselves Too
Much?," Media Challenge Hot Corner, Aug. 31, 2001, at http://www.mediachal-
lenge.com/hotcorner/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2001).
2. Editorial, Spare the Rod-Washington Shouldn't Encourage Corporal Punishment,
POsT-GAZETTE (Pittsburgh), May 21, 2001, at A16 [hereinafter Spare the Rod].
3. SeeIngraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 (1977). Employment of corporal
punishment to discipline schoolchildren in this country dates as far back as colo-
nial times. See id. (citing N. EDWARDS & H. RiCHEY, THE SCHOOL IN THE AMERICAN
SOCIAL ORDER, 115-16 (1947) and H. FALK, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, 11-48 (1941));
see also Lynn Roy, Chalk Talk: Corporal Punishment in American Public Schools and the
Rights of the Child, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 554, 563 (July, 2001).
The practice of corporal punishment originated from the belief that "children
were inherently evil and that beating [them] was an effective method of driving
the devil from them." Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal Sys-
tem, 36 SANTA CLARA L. Rv. 983, 987 (1996). See generally Fox v. Cleveland, No. 00-
2249, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15149, at *7 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 22, 2001). This belief
was enhanced by Judge Dawson, who commented "[that] [w]hile this court is sym-
pathetic to the concern of parents who do not wish for their children to be sub-
jected to any corporal punishment in school, it is permitted by law and has been
one accepted form of discipline in this country for many years." Id. See generally
IRWIN A. HYMAN &JAMES H. WISE, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION:
READINGS IN HISTORY, PRACTICE AND ALTERNATIVES 23 (Irwin A. Hyman &James H.
Wise eds., 1979).
4. See Pedro F. Fonteboa & George Richards, Taking Extra Precautions: High
School Coaches Keeping Close Eye on Hydration, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 7, 2001, at ID.
Recently numerous football players have suffered many tragedies during practices.
For example, on July 25, 2001, University of Florida freshman fullback Eraste Au-
(351)
1
Rico: Excessive Exercise as Corporal Punishment in Moore v. Willis Inde
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
352 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Athletic officials and the media attempt to spin athletic injuries
and deaths as unfortunate byproducts of playing the game.5 De-
spite their spin, "[c] oaches tweak and torque the athlete to see how
far [they] can be pushed. ' 6 Today athletes are treated as superhu-
man-heroes who are expected to play even when hurt, sick or
fatigued. 7
According to common law standards, public school teachers
and coaches may impose reasonable but not excessive force to disci-
pline a child.8 The use of excessive force or exercise to discipline a
child violates that child's substantive due process rights.9 In Fox v.
Cleveland,1o however, Judge Dawson, a United States District Judge
for the Western District of Arkansas recently opined that
"[w]hether corporal punishment is a good or bad idea is not for
this court to determine."'1 Meanwhile, some students who are sub-
jected to corporal punishment in public schools sustain physical
and psychological injuries that are too excessive to be considered
tin, eighteen, died six days after collapsing of heatstroke while jogging to the
Gators' locker room after voluntary conditioning workout. See id. Then on August
1, 2001, Minnesota Vikings star lineman Korey Stringer, twenty-seven, died fifteen
hours after collapsing of heatstroke during the Vikings' preseason practice on July
31, 2001. See id. On that same day at Clinton Central High, Indiana athlete, Travis
Stowers, seventeen, died from a brain aneurysm or heat stroke. See Steve Adamek,
Sudden Death; Rash of Football Fatalities Puts Focus on Alarming Trend, REc. (Bergen
County, NJ.), Aug. 26, 2001, at Al. A couple days later on August 3, Northwestern
University football safety Rashidi Wheeler, twenty-two, collapsed and died after a
workout. See Fonteboa & Richards, supra. Wheeler had chronic asthma, but
played with the condition since high school. See id. In addition, on August 15,
2001, in Monticello, Georgia, a middle school player Jamarious Derez Bennett,
thirteen, died from defective coronary artery during stretching drills on a day with
a heat index in the 100s. See Adamek, supra.
5. See Jay Mariotti, Tragedy at NU; Football Mentality Must Change Before it's too
Late, CHICAGO SuN-TiMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at 2.
6. See id.
7. See Ball, supra note 1.
8. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 3.20, at 288-92 (1956); W.
PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 136-37 (4th ed. 1971); Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12
VANO. L. REv. 723, 734-38 (1959); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661
(1977).
9. SeeTinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). This
court held that students do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the school-
house gate." Id. at 506. But see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985)
(Powell, J., concurring) (noting students in school have lesser expectation of pri-
vacy than members of population generally).
10. No. 00-2249, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15149 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 22, 2001).
11. Id. at *7 (Judge Dawson commenting). Judge Dawson articulated that dis-
cipline did not seem to be a problem for schools that had opted not to implement
corporal punishment. See id. Choosing not to "spare the rod" is a local decision
for schools, as long as the punishment administered in those schools is not exces-
sive or unreasonable. See id.
[Vol. 9: p. 351
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reasonable in the eyes of the law. t 2 As a result, "a principal's office
and the boxing ring are the only two public places in America
where it's legally sanctioned to strike another person." 13
This Note examines the constitutionality of excessive exercise
as corporal punishment in Moore v. Willis Independent School District
and analyzes whether students have a right to bodily integrity
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Substantive Due Process
Clause. Section II explores the facts of Moore.1 4 Section III of this
Note surveys the elements of corporal punishment, with a focus
upon both excessive exercise and excessive gym class exercise as a
form of corporal punishment.' 5 Section IV delineates the Moore
court's rationale in holding that as long as adequate state remedies
exist for students who are subjected to excessive corporal punish-
ment, there is no need to provide students with a Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process right.16 Section V provides a
critical analysis of the court's determination that the availability of
state court remedies precludes federal courts from considering stu-
dents' substantive due process claims. 17 In addition, Section V ex-
amines the compelling evidence that demonstrates why the Fifth
Circuit should reconsider its stand on not providing a substantive
due process right when corporal punishment is administered.' 8 Fi-
nally, Section VI discusses the implications and future effects of
Moore on corporal punishment and excessive exercise. 19
12. For cases holding the punishment administered was too excessive to be
considered reasonable in the eyes of the law, see infta note 51.
13. Challen Stephens, South Stands Alone and More Than One of Every 10 Licks
Lands in Alabama, THE HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, available at http://nos-
pank.net/al2.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001).
14. For a discussion of Moore facts, see infra notes 20-36 and accompanying
text.
15. For a discussion of excessive exercise and excessive gym class punishment,
see infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text. For current estimates of corporal
punishment in public schools and a description of the complex legal background
behind corporal punishment, including both the Fourteenth Amendment substan-
tive due process analysis and state statutory analysis, see infra notes 66-121.
16. For narrative analysis of the Moore decision, see infra notes 122-61 and
accompanying text.
17. For critical analysis of the Moore decision, see infra notes 162-210 and ac-
companying text.
18. For a discussion on why the Fifth Circuit should reconsider its stances on
corporal punishment, see infra notes 162-210 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the impact of the Moore decision, see infra notes 211-29
and accompanying text.
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II. FACTS
Aaron Moore was an eighth-grade student at Lynn Lucas Mid-
dle School in the Willis Texas Independent School District.20
Moore and approximately eighty other boys were enrolled in Allen
Beene's gym class. 2' During class, Beene witnessed Moore talking
during roll call, a violation of school policy, and punished Moore by
having him to do one hundred "ups and downs." 22 Though Moore
had never been similarly reprimanded in the past, he knew that
failure to complete one hundred "ups and downs," also known as
squat-thrusts, would result in serious repercussions. 23
Beene warned Moore that if he stopped he would have to start
over or go to the principal's office. 24 Moore finished the one hun-
dred squat-thrusts and then participated in approximately twenty to
twenty-five minutes of the required weight lifting for gym class. 25
For the duration of the gym class, Moore did not complain to
Beene of pain or fatigue, fearing such complaints would lead to
further punishment.26 A few days later, however, Moore was diag-
nosed with rhabdomyolysis and renal failure; he also developed es-
20. See Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 2000). In
April 1997, Aaron Moore was a fourteen-year-old student athlete who had just com-
pleted the school's basketball season and was preparing to try out for the school's
track team. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. According to an affidavit:
Beene described the exercise thus: [t]o perform an up-down the student
starts in the standing position, then squats until he can place his hands
flat on the floor. When the hands have been placed on the floor the legs
are then extended fully to the rear while the arms remain straight at the
elbows with the torso elevated above the floor. The legs are then drawn
back under the torso into a squatting position, and the exercise is com-
pleted by returning to a standing position.
Id. at 873 n.3.
23. See id. at 873. A classmate counted the repetitions while Moore completed
his punishment for fear of facing similar repercussions. See id.
24. See id. at 873.
25. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 873.
26. See id.
[Vol. 9: p. 351
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ophagitis/gastritis. 27 As a result of Moore's ailments, he was
hospitalized and missed three weeks of school.28
Nancy Moore, Aaron's mother, asserted "Beene told her the
'ups and downs' were a means of punishment necessary to control
middle school students."29 Mrs. Moore also claimed that Beene
told her that he had "intentionally inflicted pain on her son, ex-
plaining, '[w]ith high school kids you can have them do two ups
and downs and they remember the next time, [but] [w]ith junior
high kids, you have to inflict pain or they don't remember.' 30 Mrs.
Moore further commented that Ron Eikenberg, the school dis-
trict's athletic director, revealed to her that "'the coaches at the
junior high were out of control and... did their own thing."' 31
The Moores subsequently filed suit in federal district court,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First, Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
against both the school district and Allen Beene.32 The school dis-
trict and Beene responded to Moore's charges with motions to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim and, alternatively, for summary
judgment.33 In their response to the summary judgment motion,
the Moores conceded to the dismissal of their First Amendment
claim, leaving only the substantive due process and state-law
claims.3 4 The district court subsequently issued a final order grant-
27. See id.; see also id. at 873 n.4 (stating, "[r]habdmyolysis is a degenerative
disease of the skeletal muscle that involves destruction of the muscle tissue, evi-
denced by the presence of myoglobin in the urine"). Renal failure represents the
"inability of a kidney to excrete metabolites at normal plasma levels under condi-
tions of normal loading, or the inability to retain electrolytes under conditions of
normal intake." RICHARD SLOAN, SLOAN-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DIC-
TIONARY 235 (West Publ'n Co. 1992). Esophagitis is "the inflammation of the
esophagus." Id. at 226. Gastritis is "the inflammation of the stomach." Id. at 252.
28. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 873. Since the excessive exercise, Aaron has been
unable to participate in any sports or extracurricular activities and continues to
experience fatigue. See id.
29. Id. at 873.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. For explanation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see infra note 92. The Moores
also filed suit against the school district individually under Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2001), a claim they later non-suited,
and against Beene alone for state-law claims of negligence and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 873.
33. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 873.
34. See id. The matter was referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended
that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted as to all claims
after concluding that the plaintiffs could not allege a due process violation and
that Beene was entitled to official immunity from the state-law claims. See id. at
873-74.
355
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ing the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 35 On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit determined the Moores had an adequate remedy
under Texas law for Aaron's alleged mistreatment and, therefore,
could not make a constitutional claim. Consequently, the Moore's
federal claims were dismissed.3 6
III. BACKGROUND
The United States Department of Education's most recent esti-
mates put the number of regular school-administered instances of
corporal punishment at over 600,000 per year, with southern states
subjecting students to more corporal punishment than states in
other regions.3 7 Many parents, teachers and coaches grew up in
environments where corporal punishment was openly accepted.38
Accordingly, these individuals tend to strongly defend this style of
punishment out of loyalty to their predecessors.39 However, today
it has been said that
the law [is] establishing a double standard: teachers [and
coaches] who detect unusual bruises on children's bodies
are required to report suspected abuse to authorities,
while parents who see the same thing on their children as
a result of educators' [or coaches] disciplinary procedures
get little to no back up from the law.40
To the extent that the force or punishment administered by a
school official is excessive or unreasonable, the educator or coach
in virtually all states is subject to possible civil and criminal liabil-
ity. 41 Whether a particular state allows the practice of corporal pun-
35. See id. at 874.
36. See id. at 875.
37. See Andre R. Imbrogno, Corporal Punishment in America's Public Schools and
the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Case for Nonratification, 29 J.L. &
EDUC. 125, 126 n.3 (2000) (citing U.S. Department of Education 1997-1998 Civil
Rights Compliance Survey).
38. See Marlene Resnick, Spanking Teaches Wrong Lessons, THE SARASOTA HER-
ALD-TRIB., July 16, 2001, at A6.
39. See id. (reporting adult's opinions that "they deserved it and therefore
children deserve to be [punished] when they misbehave").
40. Rebecca Catalanello, Boys, Blacks Paddled the Most, MOBILE REC., July 19,
2001, at IA (quoting mother whose son was subjected to corporal punishment).
Ironically, teachers who violate child abuse laws, but follow school policy, receive
qualified immunity; while parents are liable for violating those same statutes. See
Carolyn Peri Weiss, Note, Curbing Violence or Teaching it: Criminal Immunity for Teach-
ers who Inflict Corporal Punishment, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1251, 1277 (1996).
41. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977); Simms v. Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 508 P.2d 236, 239 (Or. 1973) (discussing teacher's potential liability for
administering corporal punishment); Carr v. Wright, 423 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Ky.
[Vol. 9: p. 351
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ishment in their schools depends upon the decisions made by state
policymakers. 42 Nevertheless, local school officials retain the dis-
cretion to prohibit corporal punishment in their schools where the
state fails to proscribe corporal punishment. 43
A. What Constitutes Corporal Punishment?
According to Black's Law Dictionary, corporal punishment is
"physical punishment.., inflicted upon the body."44 The hallmark
of corporal punishment as it appears in schools is the use of physi-
cal force by a school official to reprimand a student for a school
related misbehavior. 45 Although states generally have not defined
corporal punishment, a growing number have started to include it
1968) (same). For examples of teacher liability in the Fifth Circuit, see infra note
140.
42. See Imbrogno, supra note 37, at 129. Where a state law forbids schools
from using corporal punishment, local school administrators are prohibited from
dispensing this form of discipline. See id. These administrators retain no discre-
tion on this matter. See id. "However, states which permit corporal punishment
either do not address the issue in their legislative codes or, if permitting the prac-
tice by statute, draft the statute in permissive, as opposed to mandatory terms,
allowing, but not requiring, schools to utilize physical force in disciplining their
students." Id.
43. See Fox v. Cleveland, No. 00-2249, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15149, at *7
(W.D. Ark. Aug. 22, 2001). Judge Dawson, in Fox, states that "[s]ome schools ....
do not choose to 'spare the rod' and that is a local decision as long as the punish-
ment is not excessive or unreasonable." Id.; see also Anzalone v. Tangipahoa Parish
Sch. Bd., No. 95-2533, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17660 at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 1995).
In Anzalone, the court upheld the following state statute that passed discretion on
to local policy makers: "[i]n those cases in which a parish or city school board
decides to use corporal punishment, each parish or city school board shall adopt
such rules and regulations as it deems necessary to implement and control any
form of corporal punishment in schools in its district." Id.; see also Rodriguez v.
Johnson, 504 N.Y.S.2d 379, 383 (1986) (noting that several school districts in New
York State, including New York City, have outlawed all forms of corporal punish-
ment). "No corporal punishment shall be inflicted in any of the public schools, no
punishment of any kind tending to cause excessive fear or physical or mental dis-
tress." Rodriguez, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 383 n.22 (citing BYLAWS OF THE BD. OF EDUC., CITY
SCH. DIST. OF CITY OF NEW YORK § 10.4 (1977)); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 230.23(6)(c)(1) (2000) ("The school board shall have the authority to prohibit
the use of corporal punishment, provided that the school board adopts or has
adopted a written program of alternative control or discipline.").
44. BLACK'S LAW DICTrIONARY 1000 (7th ed. 2000).
45. See Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1072
(lth Cir. 2000) (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977)).
In addition to Ingraham's definition of corporal punishment, the Tenth Cir-
cuit, in Garcia v. Miera, outlined three categories of corporal punishment: (1) pun-
ishment not exceeding long-established common law standards of reasonableness
are not actionable; (2) punishment exceeding traditional standards, which fail to
provide adequate state remedies, violate one's procedural due process rights; and
(3) punishments that are so abhorrently excessive "as to be shocking to the con-
science violated substantive due process rights, without regard to the adequacy of
state remedies." 817 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1987).
7
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in their public education statutes. 46 These statutes define corporal
punishment as "the use of physical force with the intention of caus-
ing a child to experience pain, but not injury, for the purpose of
correction or control of the child's behavior. ' 47 In those states
where corporal punishment is allowed in school, such discipline
provides no indication that children are either better behaved or
more attentive. 48 Conversely, researchers have found a direct rela-
tionship between corporal punishment in schools and delinquent
and criminal behavior later in life.49 The most familiar forms of
corporal punishment include "spanking, slapping, grabbing or
46. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 228.041(27) (2000) (defining corporal punish-
ment as "the moderate use of physical force or physical contact by a teacher or
principal as may be necessary to maintain discipline or to enforce school rule");
MICH. COMP. LAws SERV. § 380.1312 (2001) (defining corporal punishment as "the
deliberate infliction of physical pain by hitting, paddling, spanking, slapping, or
any other physical force used as a means of discipline").
47. David Orentlicher, Spanking and Other Corporal Punishment of Children by
Parents: Overvaluing Pain, Undervaluing Children, 35 Hous. L. REv. 147, 150 (1998)
(articulating sociologist Murray Straus' definition of corporal punishment). Soci-
ologist Murray A. Straus has studied and written extensively on corporal punish-
ment. See id.; see also MURRAY A. STRAUS & DENISE A. DONNELLY, BEATING THE DEVIL
OUT OF THEM 4 (1994).
48. See Cynthia D. Sweeney, Comment, Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: A
Violation of Substantive Due Process?, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1279 (1982) (suggesting,
on the basis of social science studies, that even moderate use of corporal punish-
ment is "not rationally related to any legitimate education objective"); see also Spare
the Rod, supra note 2 (arguing alternatively if punishment were so effective, officials
wouldn't need to resort to it so frequently and repeatedly).
49. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REc. E1032 (1991) (statement of Rep. Major R. Owens
of New York on outlawing corporal punishment); Michael Pastore, Too Many Par-
ents Still Hitting on Wrong Idea, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 16, 1999, at A13. Pastore ex-
plains that
[e]vidence indicates that hitting [and excessively punishing a child] is
more than ethically wrong, that it hurts them for years afterward and in
many complex ways. Physical punishment harms the child physically and
emotionally. Hitting children increases their hostility and teaches vio-
lence. And because hitting creates a frustrated and unhappy child, hit-
ting increases, not decreases, the child's anti-social behavior.
Id.; see also Patricia Cohen & Judith S. Brook, The Reciprocal Influence of Punishment
and Child Behavior Disorder, in COERCION AND PUNISHMENT IN LONG-TERM PERSPEC-
TIVES 154, 156-58 (Joan McCord ed., 1995) (discovering link between corporal
punishment and childhood conduct disorder). According to the American Psychi-
atric Association, childhood conduct disorder includes truancy, drug abuse, and
criminal conduct. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATIS-
TICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR, 312.81, 312.82, 312.89, at 93-96
(4th ed.); see also Murray A. Straus & Carrie L. Yodanis, Corporal Punishment by Par-
ents: Implications for Primary Prevention of Assaults on Spouses and Children, 2 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35, 44, 58 (1995) (finding connection between corporal punish-
ment and future violence against spouses and children).
However, as critics have observed, the data indicating a connection between
corporal punishment of children and violence as an adult is debatable. But see
Demie Kurz, Corporal Punishment and Adult Use of Violence: A Critique of "Discipline
and Deviance," 38 Soc. PROBS. 155, 156 (1991) (indicating disappointing results
[Vol. 9: p. 351
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shoving a child roughly. . and hitting with certain objects such as
a hair brush, belt or paddle. '50 The more cruel and abusive forms
of corporal punishment include piercing the skin with straight pins,
hitting kids with blunt objects, breaking bones, contouring limbs,
smacking across the genitals and ordering excessive exercise.5'
Excessive exercise is prevalent in student-based athletic pro-
grams. 52 It is not, however, the only form of corporal punishment
from social scientists trying to explain why children who experience physical pun-
ishment lead to adult violence).
50. STRAUS & DONNELLY, supra note 47, at 5; see also Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118
F.3d 507, 511 (6th Cir. 1997) (depicting corporal punishment by paddling); Gar-
cia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 653 (10th Cir. 1987) (describing principal holding stu-
dent upside down by ankles and paddling student).
51. See, e.g., Waechter v. Sch. Dist. No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (W.D.
Mich. 1991) (stating excessive exercise constituted corporal punishment); Meyer v.
Litwiller, 749 F. Supp. 981, 983 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (hitting student with blunt object
amounted to corporal punishment); Brooks v. Sch. Bd., 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1535
(E.D. Va. 1983) (piercing student's skin with straight pin was determined to be
corporal punishment); Willoughby v. Lehrbass, 388 N.W.2d 688, 691 (Mich. App.
1986) (showing painful limb contortions constituted corporal punishment); Mott
v. Endicott Sch. Dist. No. 308, 713 P.2d 98, 100 (Wash. 1986) (smacking across
student's genitals); Crews v. McQueen, 385 S.E.2d 712, 716 (Ga. App. 1989) (illus-
trating abusive corporal punishment leading to broken bones); see also 137 CONG.
REc. E1032, supra note 49 (explaining horrific punishments being administered
on students). "Students are being shocked with battery-operated cattle prods.
Burned with tacking irons used to laminate name tags. Chained to the bumper of
a car and dragged across a parking lot. Locked in coffin-shaped boxes for hours
on end." 137 CONG. REc. E1032, supra note 49.
Additionally, some less traditional forms of discipline have been described as
corporal punishment. See, e.g., London v. Dir. of DeWitt Pub. Schs., 194 F.3d 873,
875 (8th Cir. 1999) (dragging student across room and banging student's head
against metal pole by school official described as corporal punishment); P.B. v.
Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996). In Koch, the school principal hit a stu-
dent in the mouth, grabbed and squeezed the student's neck, punched the student
in the chest, and threw the student headfirst into lockers. See Koch, 96 F.3d at 1300;
see also Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 519-20 (3d Cir. 1988). In Metzger, the
school official grabbed a student in a chokehold, caused the student to lose con-
sciousness and fall to the pavement where the student broke his nose and frac-
tured his teeth. See Metzger, 841 F.2d at 519-20.
52. See Violent Coaching in Seymour, Texas -Correspondence Received by Parents
and Teachers Against Violence in Education, Jan. 27, 1989, available at http://nospank.
net/seymour.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001). In the article, two parents describe
the mistreatment of their sons, where excessive exercise and gym class punishment
were used to discipline them. See id. In particular, Susan Chambers explained that
the basketball coach punished her son because he was failing English. See id. A
doctor had recently treated the boy for a cerebral concussion the school knew
about. See id. The coach proceeded to punish the boy by giving him one lick with
the paddle and forcing him to run laps until he was told to stop. See id. The
punishment entailed:
[running] numerous lengths and then was told to stop, and then was
asked "Do you want to run more laps or get another lick?" The boy chose
the paddle, because as he [told] his mother, "he couldn't possibly run
any more and would have passed out because he had such a headache
and was totally exhausted."
9
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administered by coaches. 53 In a Tennessee school gymnasium, a
physical education teacher allegedly hit a student on the arm with a
baseball bat.5 4 In an Illinois school locker room, a gym coach or-
dered two students to stand naked for sixteen minutes while yelling
expletives at them for accidentally tearing their swimming suits
before gym class. 55 The gym coaches at the Old Joe Bradley High
School in Huntsville, Alabama, have two palm-down prints painted
on their desk.56 Students at Old Joe Bradley High School were
called into the office "whenever they were caught cutting up in the
hall."57 The students were told to " [m]atch palm-to-palm and lean
and wait." s58 In Detroit, Michigan, it is called "getting the wood," in
which football players were struck by coaches with a paddle for vari-
ous infractions such as talking back to teachers, receiving poor pro-
Id. As a result the coach was never to hit another student again and a letter was
put in his permanent record. See id. As for Mrs. Chambers' son, he returned to
the basketball program, was forced to sit the bench and the coach never allowed
him to play in another basketball game. See id.; see also Letter to the Editor About a
Violent Coach, Forced Exercise and Near Death, NEws & OBSERVER, (Raleigh, N.C.),
Mar. 18, 1992, available at http://www.nospank.net/coachl.htm (last visited Oct.
15, 2001) [hereinafter Letter to the Editor] (describing incident of violent coach in
North Carolina who forced exercise on student who almost died). In this letter to
the editor, a student recounted a near death experience he had because a coach
forced him to exercise. See Letter to the Editor. The student recalled that one day he
told the "Phys [E]d. coach" he wasn't feeling well. See id. Instead of the coach
instructing him to take it easy, the coach ordered the boy to go on a three mile
run. See id. The boy wrote that "[t]he longer I ran, the sicker I got. I'd run a while
and fall down and be sick a while. It took me 2 1/2 hours. The coach, who never
came to look for me, reported me as skipping school." Id.
Later that night a doctor found the boy's appendix had ruptured, and rushed
him to a hospital. See id. Emergency surgery was performed to save the boy's life.
See id. For the next two days it was unknown whether the boy would live or die. See
id. In his article, State, Coaches Can Offer No Alternative to Pain Sweat, John Bogert
describes the abuse of physical education teachers and coaches. SeeJohn Bogert,
State, Coaches Can Offer No Alternative to Pain Sweat, S. BAY DAILY BREEZE, July 13,
1989 available at http://nospank.net/bogert.htm. Specifically, Bogert wrote:
Know what hell is: 55 minutes with Coach Kapinski. But 55 minutes with
Coach had a way of stretching out-like chewing gum on hot tarmac-
into endless, aching minutes of punishment push-ups and (if you really
screwed up, which we always did) the after school detention periods
Coach called "tea parties."
Id. A "tea party" according to Bogert was "an hour under the [hot] sun in [Califor-
nia] frog-walking and sit-upping until [their bodies] screamed." Id.
53. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
54. SeeJennifer Barnett, Aide Resigns After Being Accused of Hitting Student, THE
TENNESSEAN, May 23, 2001, at 2B.
55. See Daniel S. v. Bd. of Educ., 152 F. Supp. 2d 949, 951-52 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(finding plaintiffs substantive due process claim foreclosed because they success-
fully stated claims based on same conduct under Fourth Amendment).
56. See Stephens, supra note 13.
57. See id.
58. See id.
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gress reports or getting poor grades.59 And finally, in Camden,
New York, a wrestling coach was found guilty of using excessive
force when he slammed a student into the wall and hit him in the
face with his forearm.
60
B. Recent Decreases in the Use of Corporal Punishment
Although the amount and severity of corporal punishment and
excessive exercise has decreased in the Twentieth Century, both
still remain an integral component of the American family, school
and playing field. 61 Educators, psychologists, doctors, civil-rights
lawyers and parents have compiled evidence which demonstrates
that "[c] orporal punishment in school [or any other learning envi-
ronment such as extracurricular sports programs] teaches a child to
distrust authority, not to respect it, and creates an environment in-
imical to the self-confidence needed for learning."62 Opponents of
corporal punishment and excessive exercise argue that such disci-
plinary measures "perpetuate [ I] a cycle of violence, teaching chil-
dren that violence is an appropriate tool for managing the behavior
of others."63 Yet, teachers and others in society believe, 'Just as par-
ents must have the right to use corporal punishment 'when neces-
sary,' teachers also need a similar right to maintain discipline and
order in schools." 64 Nevertheless, corporal punishment in public
59. Fred Girard, Player Says Coach Hit, Bruised Him: Police Examine Januaiy Pad-
dling of Detroit Murray-Wright Football Players, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 5, 2001, available at
http://nospank.net/n-h22.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001). According, fifteen-
year-old Omi Judkins, a student at Murray-Wright:
If you got a D, basically you were getting the wood.... If you got all C's
and up you were OK. Every D counts for three (whacks with the paddle),
and every F counts for five. We were over a long desk, palms down, facing
forward, and he just proceeded to hit us. I had two F's and a D, so I was
supposed to get 13 hits, but he stopped at number 10.
Id. Judkins remembered as Coach Blankenship struck him, he justified his actions
by saying, "that he wasn't doing it out of malice, he was trying to make me a man so
that I could survive out in the world." Id.
60. See Jury Finds Camden Coach Used Excessive Force, DAILY SENTINEL (Rome,
N.Y.), Oct. 26, 2001, at 9. A federal jury awarded $20,000 to a former Camden
High athlete for his claim that he was assaulted by the varsity wrestling coach and
harassed by his teammates for filing suit. See id.
61. See Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Out Humanity: Toward a New
Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
353, 353 n.4 (1998).
62. Editorial: Breaking the Hickoy Stick, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2001, at A16.
63. Id.
64. STRAUS & DONNELLY, supra note 47, at 47.
11
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schools, including excessive exercise, remains the only state-sanc-
tioned corporal punishment in the United States. 65
C. Legal Framework Behind Corporal Punishment
1. United States Supreme Court rules on Corporal Punishment in
Ingraham v. Wright
The leading Supreme Court case addressing the issue of corpo-
ral punishment in public schools is Ingraham v. Wright.66 This opin-
ion has fostered judicial indifference to corporal punishment in
schools.67 The case involved a severe incident of corporal punish-
ment where the student developed a hematoma requiring medical
attention and keeping him out of school for several days.68 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and limited its inquiry to two is-
sues: (1) whether disciplinary corporal punishment of public
school students violates the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel
and unusual punishment; and (2) whether procedural due process
requires notice and a hearing before corporal punishment is ad-
ministered. 69 The Court, however, declined to address the third
issue of substantive due process; now the primary battlefield for
constitutional challenges to public schools' use of corporal
punishment. 7
0
65. See Imbrogno, supra note 37, at 125; see also Shannon Magsam, Arkansas
Schools Still Using Paddle, Osceola School District: 1,800 Students; 1, 752 Paddlings in One
Year, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZE-rE, Feb. 11, 2001, at 1B (showing argument against
corporal punishment because "schools are the only institution in America in which
striking another person is legally sanctioned"). Corporal punishment is not al-
lowed in prisons, military institutions or in mental hospitals. See id.; see also Gra-
ham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (stating in dicta convicted prisoner protected
from excessive force); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding patient
at mental hospital had substantive due process right).
66. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). Prior to Ingraham the Supreme Court summarily
affirmed a district court decision dealing with corporal punishment. See Baker v.
Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975) (finding parental consent not required prior to admin-
istration of corporal punishment). See generally Marc I. Steinberg, Corporal Punish-
ment in Schools: Baker v. Owen - The Need for Reexamination, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 325
(1976).
67. SeeJerry Parkinson, Federal Court Treatment of Corporal Punishment in Public
Schools:Jurisprudence that is Literally Shocking to the Conscience, 39 S.D. L. REV. 276, 281
(1994).
68. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 657 (footnotes omitted).
69. See id. at 659.
70. See id. at 659 n.12; Parkinson, supra note 67, at 281 (explaining develop-
ment of battlefield).
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a. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Analysis
The Ingraham Court held that the corporal punishment used,
paddling, was neither cruel nor unusual punishment banned by the
Eighth Amendment. 71 On an examination of Eighth Amendment
history and past precedent of the Supreme Court, the shelter
against cruel and unusual punishment was designed to protect
those convicted of crimes, not school students. 72 Accordingly, the
Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment was inapplicable
when public school teachers or administrators inflict disciplinary
corporal punishment.73
b. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Analysis
The Supreme Court also addressed whether the Constitution
required a hearing before corporal punishment could be adminis-
tered.7 4 The Court believed that "[i] n view of the low incidence of
abuse, the openness of our schools, and the common-law safe-
guards that already exist, the risk of error that may result in viola-
tion of a schoolchild's substantive rights can only be regarded as
minimal. '7 5 The Court held that notice and a hearing prior to the
administering of corporal punishment in public schools is not re-
quired by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 76
c. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Analysis
The Supreme Court in Ingraham specifically declined to ad-
dress the substantive due process question, leaving it open for the
circuit courts to address.7 7 The Court in Ingraham, however, did
71. See id. at 664-71.
72. See id. at 664. The Supreme Court adheres to this longstanding limitation
and held that the Eighth Amendment does not apply in the corporal punishment
arena as a means of maintaining discipline in public schools. See id.
73. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671.
74. See id. at 680-82.
75. Id. at 682. The Court found that "[i]mposing additional administrative
safeguards as a Constitutional [sic] requirement might reduce that risk marginally,
but would also entail a significant intrusion into an area of primary educational
responsibility." Id.
76. See id.
77. See Parkinson, supra note 67, at 295 (noting longstanding acceptance of
corporal punishment in schools and possibility of state court remedies). The
Court in turn argued that having to determine the appropriateness of every in-
stance of punishment would be an abuse of its judicial power. See Ingraham v.
Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 917 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), afffd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's view regarding substantive due process claims
in the context of corporal punishment, see infra notes 114-21 and accompanying
text.
13
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suggest that excessive corporal punishment violates one's substan-
tive due process rights. 78 As the Court explained, "corporal punish-
ment in public schools implicates a constitutionally protected
liberty interest."79 The Court went on to say that "where school au-
thorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately decide to pun-
ish a child for misconduct by restraining the child and inflicting
appreciable physical pain .... Fourteenth Amendment liberty inter-
ests are implicated." 80 However, the Court emphasized that famil-
iar constraints in the school, and also in the community, provide
substantial protection against the violation of constitutional rights
by school authorities.81 Nevertheless, in the course of deciding that
state law remedies were adequate to protect against deprivations
without procedural due process, the Court observed that "there
[could] be no deprivation of substantive rights as long as discipli-
nary corporal punishment [was] within the limits of the common
law privilege [to use reasonable force in disciplining children]."82
The Supreme Court held that "unlike a procedural due process vio-
lation, a substantive due process violation is complete when it oc-
curs, making irrelevant the availability of any post hoc state
remedy."83 In addition, the Supreme Court, in Monroe v. Pape,8 4
found that regardless of an adequate state remedy, the federal rem-
edy is supplementary to the state remedy. 85 This distinction is a
distinction the federal courts have constantly made between proce-
dural and substantive due process claims. 86
78. See Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1074
(1 th Cir. 2000) (explaining Ingraham holding), affd, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 36520
(1lth Cir. 2000).
79. Ingraham, 420 U.S. at 672.
80. Id. at 674.
81. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 349 (1985) (discussing Ingraham).
In T.L.O., the Court, in discussing Ingraham, noted that "[at] the end of the school
day, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the child
brings with him the support of family and friends and is rarely apart from teachers
and other pupils who may witness and protest any instances of mistreatment."
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349 (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670).
82. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676 (emphasis added).
83. Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 877 n.6. (5th Cir. 2000)
(citing for example Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990), which notes that
constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is complete when the wrongful
action is taken).
84. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
85. See id. at 183. "Federal and State rights may . . . exist in parallel, and
federal courts may not avoid the obligation to define and vindicate the federal
constitutional right merely because of a coincidence of related rights and remedies
in the federal and state systems." Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 612 (4th Cir.
1980).
86. See Parkinson, supra note 67, at 302.
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2. State Views on Corporal Punishment
Prior to Ingraham, only two states had banned all forms of cor-
poral punishment, including excessive exercise, in public schools.
87
Presently, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia forbid
the use of corporal punishment in public schools. 88 Regardless,
more than half of the United States still permits physical punish-
ment in schools, and the discipline traditions rooted in the culture
of many of these states suggests it may take generations before any
of them change. 89
87. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 663. Those states were Massachusetts and New
Jersey. See id.
88. See ALAsKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 07.010(c) (2001); CAL. ED. CODE
§§ 49000, 49001 (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18 (West Supp. 1993);
105 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/24-24 (West 2001); IOwA CODE § 280.21 (2002); MD.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7-306 (2001); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 71, § 37G (2001); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 380.1312(3) (West 2001); MINN. STAT. § 121A.58 (2000);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302(3) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-295 (2001); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 392.4633 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-1 (West 2001); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 19.5 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-02 (2001); OR.
Rv. STAT. § 339.250(12)(a) (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-802 (2001) (pro-
hibiting corporal punishment except with written permission of parents); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1161a(7)(c) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.1 (Michie
2001); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.150.300 (West 2001); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 118.31 (2) (West 2000). In several other states the use of corporal punishment is
significantly limited, if not abolished outright. For example, in Hawaii the
"[p]unishment of pupils is limited" and "[no physical punishment of any kind
may be inflicted upon any pupil." HAw. REv. STAT. § 302A-1141 (2000); see also
Shorba v. Bd. of Educ., 583 P.2d 313, 317 (Haw. 1978). This case held that in
Hawaii "[tleachers are not permitted to administer corporal punishment under all
circumstances and in any manner." Shorba, 583 P.2d at 317.
Similarly, in Maine, teachers may use reasonable force against a student who
'creates a disturbance" if the teacher "reasonably believes it necessary to control
the disturbing behavior." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 106 (West 1983). A com-
ment to the statute, however, indicates that teachers "are not granted authority to
use force in order to punish" students. Id. at cmt. 2 (emphasis added). In New
Hampshire, corporal punishment is allowed "only in cases of self defense or under
very exceptional circumstances. Such punishment is not recognized by the state
board of education as a desirable method of discipline in New Hampshire
schools." N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ED. 203.02 (1990). Rhode Island does not specifi-
cally prohibit corporal punishment in schools; however, when a parent or person
responsible for the welfare of a child inflicts excessive corporal punishment, the
child is considered to have been abused and/or neglected. R.I. GEN. LAws. § 40-
11-2 (2001). Because corporal punishment, in schools, is not forbidden in Rhode
Island but all school districts are directed to devise a discipline policy no districts
have permitted the use of corporal punishment on students. See Parkinson, supra
note 67, at 279 n.30 (citing Telephone Interview with Mr. Vila, Legal Office,
Rhode Island Department of Education (Mar. 23, 1994)).
89. See Parkinson, supra note 67, at 280. States that permit pupil beating in-
clude: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and
Wyoming. See Jordan Riak, Danger Zones: States in the U.S. that Permit Pupil Beating,
15
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3. Pre-Moore Circuit Court Decisions
a. Courts that recognize a substantive due process claim for
corporal punishment
In recent years, federal circuit courts have debated the issue of
whether students are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment substan-
tive due process protection when subjected to corporal punishment
of any form in public schools.90 In Hall v. Tawney,9 1 the Fourth
Circuit became the first circuit court to find that excessive corporal
punishment in public schools could violate a child's constitutional
right to substantive due process, thereby subjecting school officials
to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.92 Additionally, the Fourth Cir-
cuit provided public school children a substantive due process right
to bodily integrity.93 Following the Fourth Circuit's lead in Hall,
the Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits also
determined that students had a right to bodily integrity and should
be afforded a right to substantive due process. 9 4 This right, how-
Nov. 14, 2000, available at http://nospank.net/eddpts.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2001).
90. See Parkinson, supra note 67, at 290 (observing several circuit courts ad-
dressed substantive due process issues for students subjected to corporal
punishment).
91. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
92. See id. at 611-12. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, or any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
Person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001). Section 1983 creates a cause of action for individuals
whose civil rights are violated by government officials or employees. See id.
93. See Hall, 621 F.2d at 613. Substantive due process violations are recog-
nized "as a last line of defense against those literally outrageous abuses of official
power whose very variety makes formulation of a more precise standard impossible
... we [the Fourth Circuit] simply do not see how we can fail also to recognize it in
public school children . . . ." Id.
94. See Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1076
(11th Cir. 2000) (finding coach who struck athlete in eye with metal weight lock
and blinding athlete was adequate substantive due process claim); London v. Dirs.
of the DeWitt Pub. Sch., 194 F.3d 873, 876-77 (8th Cir. 1999) (dragging student
across room and banging student's head against metal pole by school official was
corporal punishment and sufficed to warrant substantive due process violation);
Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding excessive corpo-
ral punishment could violate student's substantive due process right irrespective of
availability of adequate state law remedy, here five licks with paddle did not give
rise to constitutional violation); P.B. v. Alfred Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1996) (noting Koch's excessive use of physical force violated plaintiff's clearly
established rights giving rise to substantive due process claim); Metzger v. Osbeck,
841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988) (ruling coaches conduct of putting student in
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ever, is afforded to students only when the punishment imposed is
found to be severe, arbitrary or capricious. 95
Even though circuit courts have found that substantive due
process protects school children from any form of excessive corpo-
ral punishment, the Fourteenth Amendment often provides little
actual protection for students. 96 To meet a substantive due process
claim, a student must prove that the punishment administered
"shocks the conscience," or was "excessive, arbitrary or capricious,"
and "not dispensed in furtherance of a legitimate goal of maintain-
ing order."97 To determine whether the force used was excessive,
some courts have applied a totality of the circumstances standard.98
Specifically, these courts assess "(1) the need for the application of
corporal punishment, (2) the relationship between the need and
chokehold, causing student to lose consciousness, breaking student's nose and
teeth was arbitrary, egregious, capricious enough to warrant substantive due pro-
cess claim); Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 654 (10th Cir. 1987) (declaring that at
some point of excessiveness or brutality, holding child upside down by her ankles
while being hit several times with split board, violated her substantive due process
rights); Hall, 621 F.2d at 613 (establishing substantive due process right to be free
of brutal, demeaning and excessive paddling by public school officials). But see
Wallace v. The Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1014-16 (7th Cir. 1995)
(describing teacher who grabbed student to break up fight did not rise to level of
substantive due process violation); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 564
(8th Cir, 1988) (observing gym coach hitting student on buttocks with paddle
twice did not rise to level of excessive punishment, thereby prohibiting substantive
due process claim). Although excessive exercise has not been a highly litigated
issue, the circuit courts have addressed the availability of a substantive due process
violation with other forms of corporal punishment, which is analogous to the issue
of excessive exercise. See Waechter v. Sch. Dist. No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp. 1005,
1007 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (drawing connection between excessive exercise and cor-
poral punishment).
95. See Anzalone v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., No. 95-2533, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17660 at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 1995).
96. See David Orentlicher, Corporal Punishment in the Schools, 267 JAMA 3205,
3205 (1992) (observing lower federal courts' emphasizing few limitations imposed
under such right to liberty through Fourteenth Amendment substantive due pro-
cess in corporal punishment cases).
97. Neal, 229 F.3d at 1075. Excessive corporal punishment, when not dis-
pensed in compliance with a valid school policy allowing corporal punishment, as
in Ingraham, "may be actionable under the due process clause when it is tanta-
mount to arbitrary, egregious and conscious-shocking behavior." Id. In the Tenth
Circuit, the issue was whether the corporal punishment or excessive exercise "ap-
plied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and
was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess
of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally
shocking to the conscience." See Garcia, 817 F.2d at 655 (citing Hall, 621 F.2d at
613).
98. See Nea4 229 F.3d at 1075.
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amount of punishment administered, and (3) the extent of the in-
jury inflicted."99
Nonetheless, the circuit courts differ as to whether a substan-
tive due process right is available when an adequate state remedy is
available to the claimant as well.100 For example, the Third Circuit,
in Metzger v. Osbeck,101 found that a decision to discipline a student,
if accomplished through excessive force and appreciable physical
pain, may constitute an invasion of the student's Fifth Amendment
liberty interest in personal security and a violation of Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive due process.' 0 2 The Seventh Circuit fur-
ther recognized that unreasonable liberty restrictions or corporal
punishment could violate public school students' Fourth Amend-
ment rights. 10 3 Similarly, in Wise v. Pea Ridge School District104 and
London v. Directors of the DeWitt Public Schools,10 5 the Eighth Circuit
found that the administration of corporal punishment may violate
99. See id. The Eleventh Circuit, in Neal, held that, "at a minimum, the plain-
tiff must allege facts demonstrating that (1) a school official intentionally used an
amount of force that was obviously excessive under the circumstances and (2) the
force used presented a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious bodily injury." Id.
Some circuits offer a fourth requirement in which the plaintiff must demon-
strate that "the punishment was administered in a good faith effort to maintain
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." See
Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1988); see also London v.
Dirs. of DeWitt Pub. Sch., 194 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999) (using the four factors
established in Wise).
100. See, e.g., Neal, 229 F.3d at 1075 (holding excessive corporal punishment
could violate student's substantive due process right irrespective of availability of
adequate state law remedy); Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir.
1997) (same).
In Neal, a football coach blinded a student in one eye when he struck the
athlete with a metal weight lock, as a form of punishment for plaintiffs involve-
ment in a fight with another student. See Neal, 229 F.3d at 1071 (explaining coach
excessively punished plaintiff when his eye "was knocked completely out of its
socket," leaving it "destroyed and dismembered").
101. 841 F.2d 518 (3rd Cir. 1988).
102. See id. at 519. In Metzger, Defendant Coach Osbeck, chairman of the
school's physical education department, overheard a junior high school student,
Charles Metzger, using foul language. See id. Coach Osbeck grabbed Charles
Metzger in a chokehold causing him to lose consciousness and fall to the pave-
ment, where he fractured his nose and teeth. See id. at 519-20. The court found
the school official's act to be excessive and deserving of a substantive due process
violation. See id. at 520. The court believed that a reasonable jury could find the
restraints employed by Coach Osbeck, if responsible for the student's loss of con-
sciousness, exceeds the degree of force needed to correct Metzger's alleged breach
of discipline. See id.
103. See Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1014-16 (7th Cir.
1995). The Fourth Amendment standard is one of "objective reasonableness"
under the circumstances, without regard to the official's underlying intent or moti-
vation. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
104. 855 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1988).
105. 194 F.3d 873, 876-77 (8th Cir. 1999).
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students' liberty interests in personal security as well as substantive
due process rights. 10 6 Likewise, in P.B. v. Alfred Koch,10 7 the Ninth
Circuit held that a principal who physically assaulted students vio-
lated clearly established constitutional rights.108 Additionally, the
Tenth Circuit, in Garcia v. Miera,109 found that although Ingraham
characterized ordinary corporal punishment as violating no sub-
stantive due process rights of school children, the Ingraham Court
nevertheless acknowledged corporal punishment as implicating a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause. 110 Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Ingraham
"clearly signaled... at some degree of excessiveness of cruelty, the
meting out of such punishment violates the [s]ubstantive [d]ue
[p]rocess rights of the pupil."1 ' Finally, in Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton
County Board of Education,112 the Eleventh Circuit held that a stu-
dent alleging excessive corporal punishment can, in certain circum-
stances, assert a cause of action for a violation of his rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 13
b. Courts that do not recognize a substantive due process claim
for corporal punishment
Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit, in Fee v. Herndon,114 agreed that
"corporal punishment in public schools 'is a deprivation of substan-
tive due process when it is arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated
106. See Wise, 855 F.2d at 564; London, 194 F.3d at 876-77.
107. 96 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1996).
108. See id. at 1303 n.4 (noting possible uncertainty of finding appropriate
test to hold Koch accountable under does not immunize Koch from liability). The
Court in Koch found, for purposes of resolving the qualified immunity appeal, they
need not and do not resolve the question of whether the Fourth Amendment,
rather than the Due Process Clause, protects a student from the use of excessive
force by a school official. See id.
The standard for evaluating a qualified immunity claim was set forth in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Under the Harlow test, government
officials "generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their con-
duct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818. Determination of qualified
immunity is now based "on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as
measured by reference to clearly established law...." Id. See generally Stephanie E.
Balcerzak, Note, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 YALE L.J. 126 (1986) (detailing qualified
immunity under § 1983).
109. 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987).
110. See id. at 654.
111. Id.
112. 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000).
113. See id. at 1075.
114. 900 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1990).
369
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to the legitimate state goal of maintaining an atmosphere condu-
cive to learning.""1 15 Recently, the Fifth Circuit, in Doe v. Taylor,116
found a teacher's conduct wholly unrelated to a legitimate state
goal when the teacher sexually molested the student."17 Neverthe-
less, the Fifth Circuit refused to recognize a cause of action where
adequate state law remedies exist."18  Accordingly, Fifth Circuit
"precedents dictate that injuries sustained incidentally to corporal
punishment . . . do not implicate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause if
the forum state affords adequate post-punishment civil or criminal
remedies for the student to vindicate legal transgressions."'1 9 No
other court has adopted this exception, which has been expressly
rejected by the other circuits.' 20 This background leads us to the
present Fifth Circuit case of Moore v. Willis Independent School
District. 12 1
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
1. Majority Decision
The Fifth Circuit begins its analysis in Moore by examining the
summary judgment standard.1 22 The Moore court reviewed the re-
cord de novo, applying the same standard as the district court, and
determined that the dismissal was appropriate. 23 The standard for
115. Id. at 808 (quoting Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d
1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1984)).
116. 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
117. See id. at 445 (declaring substantive due process right available when stu-
dent is sexually molested).
118. See Fee, 900 F.2d at 808. For examples of Texas precedent see Barr v.
Bernhard, 562 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1978) (finding appropriate remedy was crimi-
nal conviction for assault); Grimes v. Stringer, 957 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. App. 1997)
(noting remedy was potential civil recovery in tort); Hogenson v. Williams, 542
S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (observing criminal conviction possible remedy
for assault).
119. Fee, 900 F.2d at 808.
120. See, e.g., P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1302 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996). The Fifth
Circuit approach is also at odds with Eleventh Circuit precedent. See McKinney v.
Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting unlike procedural due pro-
cess claim, "violation of a substantive due process right . . . is complete when it
occurs; hence, the availability vel non of an adequate post-deprivation state remedy
is irrelevant").
121. 233 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000).
122. See id. at 874.
123. See id. (citing Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377,
380 (5th Cir. 1998)). A motion for summary judgment is properly granted only if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. See id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P.
§ 56(c)).
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summary judgment "mirrors that for judgment as a matter of
law.' 24 Here, the court reviewed all favorable evidence to the mov-
ing party, concluding that the evidence the jury is not required to
believe must be disregarded. 125 The court further stipulated that
credence should be given to the nonmoving party when favorable
evidence, as well as uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence,
supports the moving party. 126
The Moore court continued its analysis by examining Aaron
Moore's substantive due process claim.127 The court analyzed the
plaintiff's requirements for alleging a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.128 In particular, the court noted that the plaintiff must first
allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States. 129 Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a
person acting under color of state law committed the alleged depri-
vation. 130 The Fifth Circuit ultimately held that the Moores did not
and could not meet the first requirement of a § 1983 claim because
the Fifth Circuit does not recognize, as a constitutional violation,
the conduct of which the Moores complained.131 The Moore court
highlighted Fifth Circuit precedent to reject public school students'
claims for denial of substantive due process through excessive cor-
poral punishment where adequate state remedies exist.132
The court further distinguished Moore from its recent case, Doe
v. Taylor, where the Fifth Circuit recognized a student's substantive
124. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The court
further stipulated that "the court must review all of the evidence in the record, but
make no credibility determinations or weigh any evidence." Id. (citing Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)).
125. See id. (citing Reeves).
126. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 874 (same).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id. (citing Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir.
1994).
130. See id. (same).
131. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 874 (remarking its determination was based on
precedent); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991) (noting whether
plaintiff had been deprived rights secured by Constitution requires threshold in-
quiry into § 1983 claim).
132. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 874 (finding no claim even if against school system,
administrators or employees alleged to have inflicted punishment). The court
continues its analysis by discussing Fee v. Herndon, where the Fifth Circuit observes
that "corporal punishment in public schools 'is a deprivation of substantive due
process when it is arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state
goal of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning.'" Fee, 900 F.2d 804, 808
(5th Cir. 1990) (citing Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1243,
1246 (5th Cir. 1984)).
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due process claim. 133 The Fifth Circuit, in Taylor, acknowledged
that students have a liberty interest in maintaining bodily integrity
that can be violated when there is no legitimate state goal.134 Moore,
however, focused upon excessive exercise imposed as punishment
to maintain discipline, "clearly a legitimate state goal." 13 5 Unlike
Moore, Taylor involved the sexual molestation of a student by a
teacher, which is an act unrelated to a legitimate state purpose. 136
The Moore court thus held that discipline must be preserved "in
school classrooms and gymnasiums to create an [environment] in
which students can learn."' 3 7
The court in Moore, also recognized that school officials, in-
cluding coaches, must understand that forcing students to perform
unreasonably excessive exercise violates the student's constitutional
right to bodily integrity by posing a risk of significant harm.1 38 The
Moore court distinguished this constitutional right, clarifying that it
is not implicated when the conduct complained of is "corporal pun-
ishment - even unreasonably excessive corporal punishment in-
tended as a disciplinary measure."'1 9 The Moore court additionally
held that because the Moores had an adequate remedy under
Texas law, they were banned from stating a constitutional claim and
their federal claims must be dismissed.140 Following Fifth Circuit
133. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 875 (distinguishing Moore from Doe v. Taylor, 15
F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994)).
134. See id. (explaining student's right in maintaining bodily integrity had
been violated by teacher's conduct).
135. Id.
136. See id. (distinguishing Moore from Taylor); see also Jefferson v. Ysleta In-
dep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding student's substantive
due process rights implicated when she was allegedly tied to chair for two days as
part of instructional technique).
137. Moore, 233 F.3d at 875.
138. See id.
139. Id. The Moore Court quoted Fee,
[o]ur precedents dictate that injuries sustained incidentally to corporal
punishment, irrespective of the severity of those injuries or the sensitivity
of the student, do not implicate the due process clause if the forum state
affords adequate post-punishment civil or criminal remedies for the student to
vindicate legal transgressions.
Id. at 875 (quoting Fee, 900 F.2d at 808 (emphasis added)).
140. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 875. Texas law immunizes educators against crimi-
nal responsibility when they use force against students, but only if they act reasona-
bly when implementing corporal punishment. See id. In particular, the Educator-
Student provision of the Texas Criminal Code states:
The use of force, but not deadly force, against a person is justified: (1) if
the actor is entrusted with the care, supervision, or administration of the
person for a special purpose; and (2) when and to the degree the actor
reasonably believes the force is necessary to further the special purpose
or to maintain discipline in a group
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precedent, the district court barred the Moores from proving
Coach Beene's alleged mistreatment of student Aaron Moore as ar-
bitrary, thus precluding their substantive due process claim against
either the school district or Coach Beene. 141
Notably, the Fifth Circuit found nothing arbitrary or unreason-
able with the district court's finding. 142 Furthermore, the court de-
clined to exercise jurisdiction over the ancillary state law claims
asserted by the Moores. 143 The Fifth Circuit thereby reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment on the remaining state-
law claims, remanding those claims back to the district court for
dismissal without prejudice.' 44
2. Circuit Judge Wiener's Special Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Justice Wiener observed that the Fifth
Circuit, in recent years, "has become increasingly isolated in ...
[its] position that substantive due process [could not] be impli-
Id. (citing TEXAS PENAL CODE § 962). Texas law provides a civil remedy, which
imposes liability on a school employee who is negligent or uses excessive force
resulting in a bodily injury when disciplining students. See id. For example,
§ 22.051 (a) of the Texas Education Code states:
A professional employee of a school district is not personally liable for
any act that is incident to or within the scope of the duties of the em-
ployee's position of employment and that involves the exercise of judg-
ment or discretion on the part of the employee, except in circumstances in
which a professional employee uses excessive force in the discipline of students or
negligence resulting in bodily injury to students.
Id. at 87!5 (emphasis added) (TEx. EDUC. CODE § 22.051 (a)). The court furnished
examples of cases where Texas provided adequate traditional common-law reme-
dies for students who had been subjected to excessive physical force. See id. at 876.
The court notes that these remedies include the possibility of potential civil
recovery in tort, or criminal conviction for assault, as well as injury to a child. See
id. (citing Barr v. Bernhard, 562 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1978) (recognizing civil
recovery for assault); Grimes v. Stringer, 957 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. App. 1997)
(potential civil recovery in tort).
In Spacek v. Charles, a middle school student claimed that the high school
coaches violated state and federal law when they approached him and allegedly
threatened to kill him if he did not improve his grades so that he could play high
school sports. See 928 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. App. 1996). The coaches countered
that the incident did not occur as the student stated. See id. The coaches also
claimed that, as a state employee acting within the scope of their employment, they
were immune from suit. See id. The court held for the student in part and for the
coach in part. See id. The court found that the coaches were immune from a
portion of the federal claims. See id. The court, however, held that a substantial
question as to the use of excessive force existed and that if it was determined that
the coaches used excessive force, then they would not be immune from suit. See id.
141. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 876. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district courts
dismissal. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 876.
144. See id.
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cated by injuries that students suffer incidental to disciplinary cor-
poral punishment as long as the state affords adequate civil or
criminal remedies."1 45 Justice Wiener, therefore, perceived the
Fifth Circuit to be totally isolated in its decision. 146 Initially, Judge
Wiener began by examining the Supreme Court's analysis in Ingra-
ham v. Wright.14 7 Judge Wiener explained that in Ingraham, the Su-
preme Court limited its grant of certiorari to whether a due process
violation existed and whether corporal punishment in schools rep-
resented cruel and unusual punishment.148 The Ingraham Court
held that corporal punishment implicated Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interests and that "there can be no deprivation of substantive
rights as long as disciplinary corporal punishment is within the lim-
its of the common-law privilege." 149 The Fifth Circuit had previ-
ously decided the substantive due process claim, while the Supreme
Court opted not to address the issue. 150
The Fifth Circuit previously held that "when a state sets reason-
able limits and provides adequate remedies, corporal punishment
cannot constitute arbitrary state action and therefore cannot sup-
145. Id. at 876-77 (WienerJ., specially concurring). Nevertheless, Judge Wie-
ner felt Aaron's injuries and the circumstances surrounding them did not consti-
tute a substantive due process violation. See id. at 877.
146. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 877.
147. See id. at 877.
148. See id. (noting that Supreme Court declined to review third question of
whether severe corporal punishment can constitute substantive due process viola-
tion, question that the Fifth Circuit answered negatively in Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 676 (1997)).
149. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676. In Ingraham, the Supreme Court "framed the
threshold question [for] whether corporal punishment may rise to a substantive
due process violation: did the corporal punishment imposed exceed the common-
law privilege historically afforded to school authorities seeking to discipline stu-
dents?" Moore, 233 F.3d at 877.
However, in Moore, Justice Wiener found that what the Supreme Court did not
hold in Ingraham was more significant than what it did hold. See Moore, 233 F.3d at
877. Judge Wiener explained that the Supreme Court in Ingraham "did not pro-
claim that an adequate remedy provided by state law or procedure constitutes a
per se bar to a student's ability to state a substantive due process claim based on
excessive corporal punishment." Id. Furthermore, Judge Wiener notes that the
Supreme Court in subsequent decisions has also found that "unlike a procedural
due process violation, a substantive due process violation is complete when it oc-
curs, making irrelevant the availability of any post hoc state remedy." Id. (citing
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). Zinermon found that "[t]he consti-
tutional violation actionable under § 1983 is complete when the wrongful action is
taken. A plaintiff... may invoke § 1983 regardless of any state-tort remedy that
might be available to compensate him for the deprivation of these rights." Id. at
877, n.6 (quoting Zinermon).
150. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 877 (Wiener, J., specially concurring) (indicating
over last two decades Fifth Circuit has recognized part of Ingraham decision that
was not reviewed by Supreme Court).
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port a claim grounded in a violation of substantive due process." 151
Justice Wiener continued by explaining that "a careful reading of
the cases that make up this line of decisions reveals that we have
never closely examined the adequacy of those state remedies, in-
stead simply dismissing section 1983 claims against school districts
and individual defendants alike, regardless of whether they might
be immune from suit."' 5 2 While the majority in Moore refused to
imply an opinion on the district court's holding that Coach Beene
was immune from liability, which ultimately indicated that he acted
reasonably, the Fifth Circuit provided no federal relief for the stu-
dent.15 3 According to the Fifth Circuit, the constitutional right to
bodily integrity is not implicated when corporal punishment is al-
leged by a student. 15 4 Justice Wiener, submitted to the fact that,
under Texas law if all defendants in corporal punishment cases are
found to be immune from liability, the next question is "whether the
state really provides a remedy to injured students at all, much less an ade-
quate one." 15
5
Judge Wiener demonstrated in his special concurrence that no
other circuit court deciding the issue of substantive due process in
school corporal punishment or excessive exercise cases has fol-
lowed the Fifth Circuit's lead. 156 Rather, the Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have all held that excessive
corporal punishment, irrespective of an adequate state law remedy,
may violate students' substantive due process rights. 157 The Ninth
Circuit has held that students are protected from excessive force
under either the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clause.
15 8
151. Id. at 878.
152. Id. (stipulating "[a]s a matter of fact, Texas school districts generally do
have state-law governmental immunity from tort claims brought by injured stu-
dents"); see, e.g., Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1990) (interpreting
without holding that under state law relief after the fact is unavailable against
school officials); Barr v. Bernhard, 562 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. 1978) ("The law is
well settled in this state that an independent school district is an agency of the state
and, while exercising governmental functions, is not answerable for its negligence
in a suit sounding in tort.").
153. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 878.
154. See id. at 875.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 878.
157. See id. at 878-79. For circuit court cases, see supra note 94 and accompa-
nying text.
158. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 878-79 (citing P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303 n.4
(9th Cir. 1996)). For a discussion of principal's physical assault on student in
Koch, see supra note 51. The court in Koch also noted that "for purposes of resolv-
ing this qualified immunity appeal, we need not and do not resolve the question of
whether the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Due Process Clause, protects a
375
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Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has also held that unreasonable
liberty restrictions or corporal punishment could violate a public
school student's Fourth Amendment rights. 159 Based on the hold-
ings in other circuit court decisions, Justice Wiener found that the
Fifth Circuit, in Fee v. Herndon, "placed too much reliance on the
mere existence of putative state-law remedies when [it] answered in
the negative the question 'whether the federal Constitution inde-
pendently shields public school students from excessive disci-
pline."' 160 In his conclusion, Justice Wiener suggested "now is the
time for this court, sitting en banc, to re-examine its position." 161
B. Critical Analysis
The Fifth Circuit inappropriately adopted the narrow rule that
when adequate state remedies are available, excessive corporal pun-
ishment, and excessive exercise, in school can never support a sub-
stantive due process claim.1 62 Moore was not a case where a teacher
used reasonable force to restore order in the face of a school distur-
bance. 163 Here, Aaron Moore's claim presented the Fifth Circuit
with a proper occasion to re-examine its view on corporal punish-
ment and whether students subjected to such punishment in the
form of excessive exercise can allege a substantive due process
claim. 164 Instead, the majority opinion in Moore completely isolated
the Fifth Circuit in its position that substantive due process cannot
be implicated by injuries that students suffer incidental to discipli-
nary corporal punishment, whatever its form, provided that the
student from the use of excessive force by a school official." Koch, 96 F.3d at 1303
n.4.
159. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 879 (Wiener, J., specially concurring) (citing Wal-
lace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1014-16 (7th Cir. 1995) (where court
used Fourth Amendment seizure standard to evaluate corporal punishment). The
Seventh Circuit in Wallace rejected plaintiff student's theory of recovery under
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Wallace, 68 F.3d at 1014-16.
160. Moore, 233 F.3d at 879 (Wiener, J., specially concurring) (citing Fee v.
Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir. 1990)).
161. Id. at 880. Justice Wiener asked the court:
Can we be the only circuit that is "in step" and all the rest out of step? We
should not demur in our own housekeeping chores and merely leave to
the Supreme Court the job of eliminating the existing split between this
one circuit and all the rest that have announced an opposite position on
the subject.
Id.
162. See id. at 874. For further discussion on how the court arrived at its hold-
ing, see supra note 132 and accompanying text.
163. For a discussion of the actual excessive exercise inflicted, see supra notes
22-24 and accompanying text.
164. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 877 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
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state affords adequate civil or criminal remedies. 165 Discipline can
rise to a level of arbitrary, capricious and shocking to the con-
science thereby affording a substantive due process claim. 166 A sub-
stantive due process claim is not available when disciplinary
punishment is related to a legitimate government objective.' 67
That legitimate government objective is to maintain order, disci-
pline and the educational environment; however, excessive exercise
is not substantially related to this legitimate government objective
giving rise to a substantive due process violation. 168
Using excessive exercise as discipline, such as forcing school
athletes to run laps, do push-ups, do squat thrusts or undergo other
excessive physical punishment for misbehavior, is just as illegal as
corporal punishment and has been deemed to be one of the most
abusive forms of discipline.' 69 When a student or athlete is forced
to do squat thrusts, push-ups or run laps, it should be done as part
of a well thought-out program where all students or athletes are
expected to participate in these activities as part of a conditioning
aspect of the athletic curriculum.' 70 Singling out students or ath-
letes to perform push-ups or laps as a type of discipline is "contrary
165. See id. For further discussion on Texas' use of adequate state remedies to
preclude federal remedies, see supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
166. See Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 299 F.3d 1069, 1074-
75 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing London v. Dir. of DeWitt Pub. Schs., 194 F.3d 873, 876-
77 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 564-65 (8th
Cir. 1988)); Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1997); Metzger v.
Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988); Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 653 (10th
Cir. 1987); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 611-14 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Fee, 900
F.2d at 808 ("[C]orporal punishment in public schools is a deprivation of substan-
tive due process when it is arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legiti-
mate state goal of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning.").
167. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1997).
168. See Waechter v. Sch. Dist. No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp. 1005, 1010 (W.D.
Mich. 1991).
169. See State Advises Against Push-Up Punishment, UNITED PRESS INT'L, July 11,
1989, available at http://www.lexis.com/research/retreive/frames?_M=884aae5bb
46044fb8cfdd6aOb5d66a9f&_fmtstr=VKWIC&docnum=l &startdoc=1 &_startchk=
lwchp=dGLStStS11b&_md5=74c3b30bed4279a5271f89f2a9f9d 165 (commenting
on sentiment advised by California State Department of Education); see also
Waechter, 773 F. Supp. at 1007 (describing excessive exercise imposed on student,
leading to student's death). The excessive exercise imposed in Waechterwas a 350-
yard dash, known as "gut run," and was required to be completed in less than two
minutes. See Waechter, 733 F. Supp. at 1007. The fifth grade teacher instructed the
student to run the "gut run" as punishment for talking in line with another class-
mate during recess. See id. While completing the run, the student suffered a car-
diac arrhythmia and died. See id.
170. Letter from M. Kathryn Scott, President of the California Association for
Health, Physical Education, Recreation, and Dance, to Bill Honig, Superintendent
of California State Department of Education (Aug. 10, 1989), available at http://
nospank.net/exerc3.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
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to sound educational practices."' 71 Excessive exercise "is not going
to teach discipline or respect.' 72 Disruptive students, who are com-
manded to perform painful or uncomfortable acts, are not going to
change their behavior. 173 Discipline through excessive exercise will
not address the athlete's behavioral problems, but instead, creates a
loathing for physical activity. 1 74 Over time this dislike of physical
activity will be more harmful to the athlete's long-term health than
any current "beneficial conditioning."1 75
Research also demonstrates that "children [exposed to corpo-
ral punishment] are from two to six times more likely to be physi-
cally aggressive, to become juvenile delinquents, and later, as
adults, to use physical violence against their spouses, to have sado-
masochistic tendencies and to suffer from depression."' 76 Recent
brain research also shows that higher-level thinking will shut down
171. See id. Sometimes coaches forget that teenagers are not adults, or that
one teen does not have the same athletic ability as another. See RAINER MARTENS,
PH.D., SUCCESSFUL COACHING 29 (Lynn Hooper & Julia Anderson eds., Human
Kinetics 1990) (1981). When coaches fail to view their athletes as successful, they
have set unrealistic expectations. See id. Coaches often have to decide whether to
pursue victory at all costs, with a possible expense being the demise of an athlete's
physical well-being or development. See id. at 3.
172. Scott, supra note 170. Coaches need to provide evaluation, not punish-
ment through excessive exercise, especially when it is clear that athletes don't
know right from wrong. See MARTENS, supra note 171, at 30. Praise your athletes if
their behavior is good and tell them specifically what is good about it. See id. If
their actions are wrong, a good coach should give the athlete specific instructions
on how to improve rather than punishing them through excessive exercise. See id.
173. See Scott, supra note 170. Educators argue that "punishment does not
work," that it can lead to more unpleasant behavior than the original problem
behavior and can even create hostility in the athlete. See MARTENS, supra note 171,
at 40.
174. Scott, supra note 170. The "time-out" method is an effective form of
punishment available as an alternative for coaches to excessive exercise because
athletes generally just want to actively participate. See MARTENS, supra note 171, at
41.
175. See Scott, supra note 170; see also How Should Coaches Punish Athletes?, STAR
TRiB., Apr. 23, 1998, at 8C (offering guidelines to coaches stipulating they should
never make athletes sweat). The guidelines specify that coaches should never use
physical activity as punishment. See How Should Coaches Punish Athletes?, STAR TRIB.,
Apr. 23, 1998, at 8C. The reasoning is that having students run laps or do push-ups
only causes athletes to resent physical activity and sports. See id. The guidelines
further state that physical activity is something that students should learn to enjoy
throughout their lives. See id. Interestingly, "[m]any outstanding athletes candidly
say that their best memories of sport[s] are not the victories themselves, but the
months of preparation and anticipation and the self-revelation before and during
the competition." MARTENS, supra note 171, at 7.
176. Resnick, supra note 38 (citing STRAUS & DONNELLY, BEATING THE DEVIL
OUT OF THEM, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES (1994)).
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if children feel threatened. 177 Experienced on a regular basis, this
stress will produce an inability to think before acting.'
78
In what the Fifth Circuit calls the "leading [Supreme Court]
corporal punishment case," Ingraham v. Wright, the Supreme Court
declined to address whether severe corporal punishment could
constitute a substantive due process violation.179 In doing so, the
Supreme Court fostered the Fifth Circuit's decision on the issue of
substantive due process in the context of corporal punishment.
80
Even though the Ingraham Court declined to answer the substantive
due process question, the Court did suggest a favorable view that
excessive corporal punishment violates substantive due process.
181
The Court also explained that "where school authorities, acting
under color of state law, deliberately decide to punish a child for
misconduct by restraining the child and inflicting appreciable phys-
ical pain, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests
are implicated.' 8 2 Yet in the course of deciding that state law rem-
edies were adequate to protect against deprivations without proce-
dural due process, the Ingraham Court observed, that "there
[could] be no deprivation of substantive rights as long as discipli-
nary corporal punishment [was] within the limits of the common
law privilege [to use reasonable force in disciplining children]."183
177. See id.
178. See id. Resnick explained that: when higher-level thinking skills close
down
[t]he limbic system, which is responsible for the fight or flight response,
takes over. When this happens, chemicals in the brain are released that
actually affect the developing architecture of the brain. This type of high
stress on a regular basis has been proven to produce a brain which is
impulsive, hyper-reactive and which does not have the ability to think
before acting.
Id.
179. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 877 (Wiener, J., specially concurring) (citing Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659 n.12, 679 n.47 (1977)).
180. See Parkinson, supra note 67, at 295 (noting Fifth Circuit's acknowledge-
ment of state court remedies and longstanding acceptance of corporal punish-
ment in schools). The Fifth Circuit contended in Ingraham that it would be an
abuse of its judicial power to determine the apprpriateness of particular punish-
ments. See Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 917 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), affd,
430 U.S. 651 (1977).
181. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672 (finding that corporal punishment in pub-
lic schools does implicate a "constitutionally protected liberty interest"); see also
Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1074-75 (11th Cir.
2000) (indicating those Courts of Appeals which have examined Ingraham's lan-
guage have held that "plaintiff['s] alleging excessive corporal punishment may in
certain circumstances state a claim under the Substantive Due Process Clause").
182. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674.
183. Id. at 676 (emphasis added).
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Most interestingly, however, is what the Supreme Court did not
hold in Ingraham - that "an adequate remedy provided by state law
or procedure constitutes a per se bar to a student's ability to state a
substantive due process claim" based on excessive corporal punish-
ment.184 The Supreme Court's subsequent writings heighten the
significance of this by stating that "unlike a procedural due process
violation, a substantive due process violation is complete when it
occurs, making irrelevant the availability of any post hoc state rem-
edy."'1 85 Thus, the Fifth Circuit's posture on substantive due pro-
cess claims is predicated on the belief that the availability of state
court remedies precludes federal court consideration. 186 The Fifth
Circuit's analysis, however, "ignores a distinction federal courts
have consistently made between" both procedural and substantive
due process claims. 187 In Moore, Judge Wiener was concerned with
the court's holding and whether Texas law actually provided an ad-
equate state remedy at all for students injured by teachers and
coaches in school. 188 The Supreme Court, in Monroe v. Pape, found
that "[i] t is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced
would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before
the federal one is invoked."' 8 9
While, the Fifth Circuit in Ingraham answered the substantive
due process question in the negative, it did not state that corporal
punishment could not rise to the level of a constitutional violation
under any circumstances. 90 When examining Moore, the case is
similar to Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton because both are distinguishable
184. Moore, 233 F.3d at 877 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
185. Id. at 877 (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). The
Supreme Court in Zinermon noted that a constitutional violation actionable under
§ 1983 is complete when the wrongful action is taken. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at
125. Regardless of any available state remedy, a plaintiff may invoke § 1983 for
compensation for the deprivation of any constitutional rights. See id.
186. See Parkinson, supra note 67, at 302.
187. Id.
188. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 878 (Wiener, J., specially concurring). Justice Wie-
ner questions the Fifth Circuit's decision because "if all defendants are immune
from liability under Texas law, the question presented becomes whether the state
really provides a remedy to injured students at all, much less an adequate one." Id.
189. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). "Federal and State rights may
exist in parallel, and federal courts may not avoid the obligation to define and
vindicate the federal constitutional right merely because of a coincidence of re-
lated rights and remedies in the federal and state systems." Hall v. Tawney, 621
F.2d 607, 612 (4th Cir. 1980).
190. See Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1073
(1 th Cir. 2000) (interpreting Ingraham).
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from the Fifth Circuit's view of Ingraham.191 In Moore, just as in
Neal, it was not argued that the excessive exercise Coach Beene im-
posed was pursuant to a school corporal punishment policy which
Ingraham requires. 192 Also, the case fails to note whether Coach
Beene conferred with school administrators before punishing
Moore or whether he was expressly authorized by school officials to
administer the punishment he allegedly inflicted upon Moore. 193
Instead, Coach Beene, a gym teacher, summarily and arbitrarily
punished Moore, a student, by ordering Moore to perform one
hundred "ups and downs." 194
The Moore court's view on substantive due process is not in ac-
cord with any other federal appellate court.1 95 In refusing to con-
sider questions on substantive due process, with regard to excessive
exercise and corporal punishment, the Fifth Circuit stands alone. 196
In the context of disciplinary corporal punishment in public
schools, a "substantive due process claim is quite different than a
claim of assault and battery under state tort law."1 97 The focus on
the abuse of power is a crucial distinction between constitutional
violations and routine torts.198 Nonetheless, some corporal punish-
ments in school may be "so brutal, demeaning and harmful," so
"literally outrageous," as to violate the student's Fourteenth Amend-
191. See id. at 1074 (distinguishing Neal from Ingraham).
192. See id.
193. See generally Moore, 233 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000). See also, Neal, 229 F.3d at
1074 (suggesting facts of Neal distinctively different from Ingraham, presenting en-
tirely different issue). Although not required by Ingraham many states and school
districts require the teacher to confer with principal before punishment is adminis-
tered; that the punishment be administered in the presence of another school
official; and that the parents be notified before corporal punishment is adminis-
tered. See id. at 1073 n.1.
194. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 873 (Wiener, J., specially concurring). It is uncer-
tain whether the excessive exercise imposed in Moore would necessarily rise to the
level of a constitutional violation, but the Moores should have had the opportunity
to argue that their son's substantive due process rights were violated. See id. at 877.
195. See id. at 880.
196. See Parkinson, supra note 67, at 303; see also Moore, 233 F.3d at 878-79
(Wiener, J., specially concurring) (noting Fifth Circuit isolation from other juris-
dictions on substantive due process issue). For a further discussion of the Fifth
Circuit's isolation on this issue, see supra notes 145-61 and accompanying text.
197. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). Substantive due pro-
cess determinations do not turn on whether ten licks as opposed to five licks would
be excessive as would be the case in a state tort claim. See id. Instead, substantive
due process is concerned with violations of bodily security of a higher magnitude.
See id.
198. See Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 523 (3d Cir. 1988) (Weis, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (advising caution when relying on extents of
injuries to determine when conduct escalates to constitutional violation). The ex-
tent of an injury affects the amount of damages, not liability. See id.
31
Rico: Excessive Exercise as Corporal Punishment in Moore v. Willis Inde
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
382 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
ment rights. 199 The existence of the privilege of bodily security is
the "most fundamental aspect of personal privacy" and is unmistak-
ably established in our constitutional decisions as an attribute of the
ordered liberty that is the concern of substantive due process. 20 0
For public school children, who are lawfully confined to the class-
room, arbitrary corporal punishment represents an invasion of per-
sonal security to which their parents have not consented when
entrusting their children to the State. 20 ' The Fourth Circuit, in
Hall v. Tawney, declared that
the substantive due process inquiry... must be whether
the force applied caused injury so severe, was so dispro-
portionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by
malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise
excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane
abuse of official power literally shocking to the
conscience. 20 2
Determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred,
courts must examine why force was applied, the correlation be-
tween the need and the amount of force used, the extent of injury,
the teacher's or coach's actions to keep or restore order and the
reasons for inflicting harm.20 3 In some instances, corporal punish-
ment that is reasonably related to the legitimate state interest of
maintaining order in schools or on the athletic field will not violate
a student's Fourteenth Amendment rights. 20 4 Nonetheless, the
Fifth Circuit refuses to examine each individual instance of punish-
ment to determine whether it has been administered arbitrarily or
capriciously.20 5
199. See Hall 621 F.2d at 613.
200. See id.
201. P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Sandin v. Con-
ner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995)).
202. Hall, 621 F.2d at 613; see also Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 507, 514
(6th Cir. 1997) (agreeing that Hall's substantive due process inquiry is appropriate
to make in instant case).
203. See Metzger, 841 F.2d at 520 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033
(2d Cir. 1973)). In Metzger, the court stated that ajury might reasonably conclude
that as a physical education teacher and extracurricular sports coach, Osbeck
should have been aware of the inherent risks of restraining a student by force. See
id. at 521.
204. See Hall 621 F.2d at 611-12 (explaining that one's constitutional rights
can be violated when punishment exceeds in severity that which is reasonably re-
lated to maintaining classroom order).
205. See Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 917 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
affid, 930 U.S. 651 (1977) (noting it is not court's duty to rule on wisdom of
school's internal discipline regulation). The Fifth Circuit explained that such in-
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Overall, many courts have been reluctant to expand the con-
cept of substantive due process because "guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-en-
ded."20 6 A persuasive rationale articulated by some courts is that
the Fourteenth Amendment is not a "front of tort law" to be used,
through section 1983, to transfer state tort claims into federal
causes of action.20 7 Nevertheless, in certain situations, a student or
athlete alleging corporal punishment generally, and excessive exer-
cise particularly, may assert a cause of action for violating their
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, ex-
cept in the Fifth Circuit.20 8
The Fifth Circuit's tolerance for corporal punishment reflects
not only the undervaluation of students but also an overvaluation of
pain and other kinds of suffering.20 9 Due to this circuit's overvalua-
tion of pain and suffering, it is inclined to see greater virtue in cor-
poral punishment than is justified by its actual benefits and
harms.210
V. IMPACT
The continuing uncertainty surrounding substantive due pro-
cess has led to a conflict among the circuits that treat the constitu-
tional rights of students differendy depending on where they
live.211 This inconsistency has been apparent at least since 1980,
when a student's substantive due process right to be free from ex-
cessive corporal punishment was recognized in Hall by the Fifth Cir-
cuit.2 12 It is too late to argue that federal courts should stay out of
the corporal punishment and excessive exercise arenas, so now it is
quiries would be a misuse of their judicial power to determine whether a teacher
had acted arbitrarily in paddling a child for certain behavior or whether in a par-
ticular instance the student's misconduct warranted five licks instead of ten. See id.
206. Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1074 (11th
Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
207. See id. The Supreme Court did not think that the drafters of the Four-
teenth Amendment intended the Amendment to play such a role in our society.
See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981).
208. See Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000);
see also supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing circuits that have similarly
upheld a cause of action for substantive due process).
209. See Orentlicher, supra note 47, at 177 (observing children are
undervalued).
210. See id. at 185. Alternatively, the pain caused by corporal punishment is
mistaken to be beneficial to a child's social progress when in actuality it is more
harmful to the child's psychological and behavioral well-being. See id.
211. Parkinson, supra note 67, at 302.
212. See id.
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"incumbent upon them to apply a meaningful standard by which to
judge substantive due process claims. '213 Perhaps the strongest ar-
gument against corporal punishment and excessive exercise is the
availability of non-violent alternatives for disciplining students and
athletes.214 Many argue that "discipline has nothing to do with
punishment. '" 215 Discipline is about teaching students and athletes
what they need to know to become self-disciplined and responsi-
ble.216 It is important to acknowledge that no absolute empirical
evidence exists on the effects of corporal punishment.2 17 Despite
uncertainties in the data, however, the existence of evidence sug-
gesting harm leaves reason to be concerned about corporal punish-
ment, because even if corporal punishment is effective, it still
violates basic values of human dignity and respect. 218 With the
Fifth Circuit's decision sanctioning corporal punishment, it is al-
213. Id. at 303-04.
214. See Irwin A. Hyman, Corporal Punishment, Psychological Maltreatment, Vio-
lence, and Punitiveness in America: Research, Advocacy, and Public Policy, 4 APPLIED &
PREVENTATIVE PSYCHOL. 113, 119 (1995). However, regardless of these alternatives
"it is important for coaches to have realistic goals not only about their athletes'
performance abilities, but about their emotional and social behavior as well. Re-
member, it's natural for kids to 'horse around' and have fun." MARTENS, supra
note 171, at 29.
215. See Resnick, supra note 38.
216. See id. (noting that discipline is about helping students behave better
next time). "Coaches clearly face a dilemma about their objectives when they
coach." MARTENS, supra note 171, at 5. When it comes to sports, society awards
winners, not losers. See id. "Coaches who play only their best athletes, who play
injured athletes, or who scream disparagingly at athletes who have erred demon-
strate that winning is more important to them than [the] athletes' development."
Id.
217. See Orentlicher, supra note 47, at 160; see also Marjorie Lindner Gunnoe
& Carrie Lea Mariner, Toward a Developmental-Contextual Model of the Effects of Paren-
tal Spanking on Children's Aggression, 151 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT
MED. 768, 774 (1997) (recognizing additional research needed to reconcile com-
peting interpretations offered on effectiveness of corporal punishment). Addi-
tional research, however, is not required for understanding that excessive exercise
is not essential to evaluate an athlete's performance; the sports competition does
that already. See MARTENS, supra note 171, at 30. "Usually athletes know when they
have played poorly. Who needs to be told you made an error when the ball goes
between your legs and the game winning run scores? Athletes need some room to
make mistakes-that's part of learning." Id.
218. See Orentlicher, supra note 47, at 160 (commenting that society no
longer condones or tolerates physical assaults of people, especially children).
Even in the context of professional sports, society does not condone violence
outside the playing arena. See Erik Brady & Gary Mihoces, Crossing the Line: Player-
Coach Battle Stirs Debate, USA TODAY, Dec. 5, 1997, at C1 (discussing public's intoler-
ance of off-field violent incidents involving players and coaches). "A sports league
does not have to accept or condone behavior that would not be tolerated in any
other segment of society," announced NBA Commissioner David Stern regarding
the suspension of a player for physically assaulting his coach. Id.
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most impossible for society to send a clear message against the use
of physical violence. 219
There can be no debate that the existence of excessive exercise
or corporal punishment in gym class can cause serious injuries and
can kill in some instances. 220 Athletes are expected to give 110%
and push their bodies beyond its limit, to retain their spot on the
team and prevent their jobs from going to someone who will. 22 1
The recent deaths of athletes of all ages and abilities, should signal
that requiring an athlete to give 110% isn't always positive. 222
Clearly, excessive exercise is one of the most abusive forms of cor-
poral punishment and, yet, students rarely complain.223 It is Vince
219. See Orentlicher, supra note 47, at 185.
220. For recent tragedies resulting from excessive exercise, see supra note 4.
See also Ball, supra note 1 (indicating sports officials at all competitive levels have
begun intense investigations into practices to prevent future deaths from excessive
exercise). "Winning or [disciplining] . . . is never more important than athletes'
well-being, regardless of the mixed messages our society sends." MARTENS, supra
note 171, at 8 (emphasis added). When coaches keep winning in perspective,
sport programs produce young people who enjoy sports, who strive for
excellence, who dare to risk error in order to learn, and who grow with
both praise and constructive criticism. When winning is kept in perspec-
tive, there is room for fun in the pursuit of victory-or, more accurately,
the pursuit of victory is fun. With proper leadership, sport programs pro-
duce young people who accept responsibilities, who accept others, and
most of all accept themselves.
Id.
221. See Training Camp Tragedy, TOPEKA CAPITAL JoURNAL, Aug. 3, 2001. The
fact remains that the game, whatever sport it may be, "is no longer in its purest
form and won't be again-until athletes stop abusing their bodies to avoid losing
their status on the team, hurting their ego, or quite possibly, losing their job."
Ball, supra note 1. This mentality is true for "[cloaches who skillfully help young
people become better [individuals] but fail to win an often unknown [number] of
games are considered losers, and all too often are fired." MARTENS, supra note 171,
at 5; see also Cordelia Anderson, College Football Coaches Under Pressure: Increased Need
for Exemplary Communication Skills, SPORTS MEDIA CHALLENGE: HOT CORNER (Nov.
1998), available at http://www.mediachallenge.com/hotcorner/coaches.html (last
visited Dec. 30, 2001) (describing two college football coaches relieved of their
positions due to losing seasons).
222. See Training Camp Tragedy, supra note 221. Recent tragedies "must serve
as a wakeup call to coaches and players alike to the danger of [excessive exercise]
and practicing football-or soccer, or cross country or even volleyball . . . in op-
pressive heat." Id. The objective of every athlete and coach should be to win
within the rules of the game. See MARTENS, supra note 171, at 6. "Winning isn't
everything, it's the only thing," should not be the objective. See id. at 6-7 (emphasis
added). Athletes should never feel pressured to continue practicing or pushing
harder, for fear of suffering consequences, against what their body is telling them,
even if it means sitting out when others are still participating. See Ball, supra note
1.
223. For a discussion of various abusive forms of corporal punishment, see
supra note 51 and accompanying text. See also supra note 60 and accompanying
text describing how a student who complained of excessive force by a coach was
harassed by fellow teammates.
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Lombardi's sentiment that "winning is not everything . .. it's the
only thing," that permeates the coaching mentality, while fre-
quently damaging the athlete-coach relationship. 224 Nonetheless,
an attempt to change the current mentality of coaches that accept
corporal punishment and excessive exercise as appropriate discipli-
nary and conditioning measures, would most likely prove impossi-
ble. 225 Still, making coaches and players more aware of and
accountable for the dangers of excessive exercise is possible. 226
Coaches and teachers need to realize that when excessive force or
exercise is used to discipline or condition a student, it violates that
student's substantive due process rights, regardless of the availabil-
ity of an adequate state remedy.227
The Fifth Circuit should re-evaluate its stance on corporal pun-
ishment and the availability of a substantive due process claim, be-
cause it is the only circuit not "in step" with other federal circuit
courts. 228 The Fifth Circuit should not "demure in [its] own house-
keeping chores and... leave to the Supreme Court the job of elimi-
nating the existing split between this one circuit and all the rest
that have announced an opposite position on the subject."229
Kristina Rico
224. See Carolyn Thornton, For Lombardi, Winning Wasn't the Only Thing,
BROWN/JoURNAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONFERENCE, Feb. 29, 2000, available at http://
www.projo.com/special/bpjconf/20000229.htm (noting Vince Lombardi uttered
this phrase more than 30 years ago and since then it has transcended the sports
world and become ingrained in American culture). "Trust between students and
school officials, including teachers and coaches, is critical to learning because it
helps motivate students to learn independently and comply with instructions with-
out coercion." See Weiss, supra note 40, at 1284-85. When coaches use criticism
and punishment to eliminate undesirable behaviors, this negative communication
"increases athletes' fear of failure, lowers their self-esteem, and destroys [the
coach's] credibility." MARTENS, supra note 171, at 28. Coaches are more likely to
build successful teams when they understand the importance of the athlete-coach
relationship. See Anderson, supra note 221. Even though many coaches believe
that the "spontaneous tirade" is effective, it can be counterproductive. See id.
"Strong athlete-coach relationships may not guarantee a win, but they build trust
within a team and improve its long term prospects." Id.
225. See Training Camp Tragedy, supra note 221. All too many veteran coaches
are accustomed to the pursuit of winning regardless of the costs. See MARTENS,
supra note 171, at 5. "This [mentality] must change, and coaches must take re-
sponsibility for making the change." Id. Coaches must resist the forces of society
and the media encouraging them to win at all costs, while becoming clearer about
their coaching objectives. See id.
226. See Training Camp Tragedy, supra note 221.
227. SeeSaylorv. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1997); see also supra
note 94 and accompanying text.
228. See Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 880 (5th Cir. 2000)
(Wiener, J., specially concurring).
229. Id.
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